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In a competitive and Walrasian stable world with two goods transfer 
paradoxes are very robust o endogenization (relating the size of the transfer to 
either the donor's or the recipient's GNP). Donor enrichment and/or ecipient 
impoverishment occur in very general formulations of endogenization if and 
only if they occur in the model in which transfers are exogenous (as is 
usually assumed). Endogenization in practice will probably cause a dampening 
effect (smaller price and welfare changes than in the case of pure exogenous 
transfers). 
1. Introduction 
Transfer paradoxes, i.e. donor enrichment and/or ecipient impover- 
ishment, cannot occur in a two-country distortion-free Walrasian stable 
world, see Samuelson (1947). Those paradoxes can  occur, however, if 
(i) there are at least three countries (or agents), see e.g. Gale (1974) or 
Brecher and Bhagwati (1981), or (ii) if there are domestic distortions, 
see e.g. Brecher and Bhagwati (1982). The economic intuition for the 
occurrence of transfer paradoxes, which depends largely on the terms- 
of-trade effect caused by the transfer, can be found in Ohyama (1974), 
Bhagwati, Brecher, and Hatta (1983, 1985), henceforth referred to as 
BBH, and Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988). For example, BBH argue 
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that (exogenous-type) transfer paradoxes in the three country setting are 
caused by a "foreign" distortion. By this they mean that the countries 
directly involved in the transfer (the donor and the recipient) are not 
using an optimal tariff (are not exploiting their joint monopoly power) 
vis-~t-vis the non-participant. Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) extend 
this analysis to an arbitrary number of countries and goods and show 
that inferiority and/or complementarity are necessary conditions for the 
existence of strict Pareto improving transfers. 
Here we want to point out the remarkable robustness of transfer 
paradoxes with respect o "endogenization" of transfers. We use the 
latter term to reflect he empirical observation that transfers are given 
from rich countries to poor countries and that the size of the transfer 
is positively related to the donor's income and negatively related 
to the recipient's income. The positive relation with respect o the 
donor's income has been formalized, for example, by the United 
Nations Resolution no. 2626, which states that at least 0.7 percent 
of rich countries' GNP should be used for development assistance. 
The negative relation with respect o the recipient's income can be 
illustrated by the recent proposal of the IGGI countries 1 to decrease 
(in real terms) the development assistance given to Indonesia because 
of its recently flourishing economy. Relations like this make transfers 
partly endogenous. The recent literature, see e.g. Kemp and Shimomura 
(1991), Berth61emy (1988), or Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) and 
the references therein, has not paid attention to this link between 
aid and GNP. Berth61emy (1988) notes that " . . .  this literature is on 
the whole extremely disconnected from policy issues concerning the 
opportunity of aid and capital transfers to LDCs." (p. 420), but he does 
not pay attention to the endogenization issue either. We investigate 
the main consequences of endogenization by modifying the model 
developed by BBH. 
2. Endogenous Transfers 
Consider a perfectly competitive world with two goods, produced 
and consumed in three countries. 2 Country 1 makes a transfer to 
country 2. Tariffs, quotas, transport costs, and other barriers to trade 
1 The InterGovernmental Group on Indonesia, the IGGI, is a group of 
donor countries that collaborates on development issues with respect o In- 
donesia. 
2 Extension to an arbitrary number of countries is straightforward, see 
Brakman and van Marrewijk (1989). 
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are absent from the model. 3The relative price of good X is therefore 
equal in the three countries. It should be noted that the model can also 
be applied to represent a transfer from one agent o another within a 
country. The following notation will be used: 
X, Y 
P 
~(x ,Y )  
e~(p, u ~) 
~(p) 
ci(p, u i) 
x~(p) 
TA 
i 
goods X and Y, respectively; good Y is the numdraire; 
the relative price of good X; 
the welfare level of country i; 
expenditure function of country i; 
revenue function of country i; 
compensated consumption of good X by country i; 
production of good X in country i; 
import demand for good X by country i (m i = c i - xi); 
exogenous (or autonomous part of the) transfer; 
country index; i = 1, 2, 3. 
In order to investigate the effects of endogenization we will model 
endogenization as follows. The total transfer given from country 1 to 
country 2 consists of two parts; an exogenous part denoted by TA,  
which represents discretionary policy, and an endogenous part. The 
latter depends on the expenditure l vel of the donor and is represented 
by T(e l(p, u 1)).4 It is assumed that T is a smooth and monotonically 
increasing function, i.e. the richer the donor gets the larger the transfer 
it gives. We will use indices to denote derivatives of functions, e.g. 
is the derivative of country 3's expenditure function with respect to ep 
i = c i and i = x i price. Recall, from standard uality theory, that ep rp 
for all i. At the initial equilibrium we normalize the derivative of the 
i expenditure function with respect to utility, eu = 1 for all i. 
The model consists of the following equations 
el(p,  71) _ r l (p )  _~_ T (e l (p ,  u l ) )  _~_ TA = 0 ,  (1) 
e2(p, ?2) _ f2(p)  __ T (e l (p ,  u l ) )  __ TA = 0,  (2) 
3(p,  3 )  _ 3 (p)  = 0 ,  (3) 
ml(p,u 1) +m2(p,u 2) +m3(p,u 3) = O. (4) 
Equation (1) says that the donor, country 1, cannot spend more than its 
earnings minus the transfer given to country 2. Debts and stock-piling 
are absent from the model. Similarly, equation (2) indicates that the 
3 On this see for example Bhagwati, Brecher, and Hatta (1985). 
4 For a more general description of endogenization see section 3. 
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recipient, country 2, can increase its expenditure by the amount of 
the transfer. Country 3 cannot spend more than it earns [equation (3)]. 
Finally, equation (4) represents he global market-clearing condition for 
good X (and hence, by Walras' Law, for good Y). The model consists 
of four equations and has four endogenous variables (u i, i = 1, 2, 3 
and p). 
Starting from an initial equlibrium and taking the total differential 
of (1)-(4) we obtain 
l+Te l  0 
-T~I 1 0 rn 2 - t [ du 2 11 
0 0 1 m3 [ dug = d TA , (5) 
1 2 3 m~ m~ m u mp k dp 
1 2 3 and t = cite1.  Obviously the BBH where mp =_ mp +mp +mp 
results can be readily calculated by assuming Tel = 0 as their model 
is a special case of ours. After applying Cramer's rule and some 
manipulations we get 
dp/dTA = (m~-  m~)/a  = ( s  [ex, (6) 
du l /dTA = - ( f2 /a )  - mldp/dTA = ( f2 /A)du l /dTA]ex  , (7) 
du2/dTA = (s  m2dp/dTA = (~2/A)du2/dTAlex , (S) 
d a/dTA = -m3dp/dTA = (9 /A)du3/dTA]ex  , (9) 
1 1 2 2 3 3 where f2 ==_ m mu + m m~ + m m~-  mp andA- -  [ ( l+Te l  ) -  
X 1rife 1 dp/d  TA [ex] f2. The symbol lex refers to "exogenous" and is used 
to identify the exogenous multipliers derived by BBH. Obviously, in 
the special case of exogenous transfers (BBH) (2 = A. It is well known 
that f2 equals minus the slope of the general equilibrium excess demand 
schedule of good X in the exogenous model. 5 Similar reasoning holds 
5 Let v ~ be the indirect utility function of country i. The uncompensated 
global excess-demand for X is ml(p ,v  1) + m2(p,v 2) + ma(p, v3). If 
we differentiate this with respect o p, using Roy's identity and our nor- 
1+ 1 1+ 2+ 2 2+ 3+ 3 3 malization, we obtain: rnp  muv p mp muv p mp muv p = 
1 1 2 2 3 3 mp -- m m u -- m m u -- m m u = -- ~2. Requiring f2 and A to be positive, 
and hence stability, makes sense in that a change in a parameter (TA) will 
bring us back to this stable equilibrium, whereas a change in a parameter 
starting from an unstable quilibrium would take us to a stable equilibrium 
according to the global correspondence principle, see Samuelson (1971) or Ide 
and Takayama (1990). 
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for A with respect to the endogenous model. Walrasian stability requires 
a price increase in the non-num6raire good if there is an excess demand 
for that good. This implies therefore that both s and A are positive. 
We see clearly, then, from equations (6)-(9) that all the multipliers in 
the endogenous case are a positive scalar multiple, namely J?/A, of the 
multipliers in the exogenous case. This leads to the following important 
conclusion: 
Proposition 1: Transfer paradoxes (donor enrichment and/or recipient 
impoverishment) occur in the case of endogenous transfers if and only 
if they occur in the case of exogenous transfers. The price of good X 
rises in the endogenous case iff it rises in the case where transfers are 
exogenous. 
The model displays a remarkable robustness with respect to this type 
of endogenization. Donor enrichment and recipient impoverishment can 
still occur but only if it already occurred in the exogenous case. 6Even 
though there is no particular relation between income levels and income 
derivatives of consumption, which implies transfer paradoxes cannot be 
ruled out a priori, one would at least expect a change in the conditions 
under which paradoxes do arise because the welfare and price effects 
are influenced (i.e. mitigated, see proposition 2) by the endogenous 
transfer. A possible explanation is given by BBH who argue that, 
as mentioned earlier, (exogenous-type) transfer paradoxes in the three 
country setting used here are caused by a "foreign" distortion. By which 
they meant that the countries involved in the transfer (the donor and 
the recipient) are not using an optimal tariff (are not exploiting their 
joint monopoly power) vis&-vis the non-participant. As the distortion 
is still present he transfer paradox should also still occur, as indeed it 
does. 
For obvious reasons we will call f2/A the "multiplier" and say that 
"dampening" occurs if it is smaller than one. We can now formulate 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: Dampening, ~/A  < 1, occurs if and only if the 
following condition holds: 
drl(p)/dTA [~x < 1 . (10) 
6 In section 3 below we show that the same holds for more general forms 
of endogenization in which the transfer is also related to the donor's revenue 
level and the recipient's expenditure or revenue level. 
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A sufficient condition for dampening is the absence of price effects, i.e. 
if the marginal propensity to import good X is the same in countries 1 
and 2. 
The condition in equation (10) is easy to understand and straight- 
forward to derive. Suppose it does not hold, then transfering one unit 
of purchasing power results in a revenue increase of more than one 
unit and thus increases the endogenous transfer. 
1 2 .  The absence of price effects (i.e. if m~, = m~, the marginal 
propensity to import good X is the same in countries 1 and 2) is 
a sufficient condition for equation (10) to hold. The multiplier then 
is Y2/A = 1/(1 + T~I) < 1. This effect is not hard to understand 
either. Suppose country 1 gives 1 extra unit of (autonomous) aid. Its 
expenditures will have to be reduced by 1 unit while at the same 
time country 2's expenditure can increase by 1 unit. But then the 
(endogenous) aid will decrease by T~I units. Country l 's  expenditure 
will then increase by this amount. Endogenous aid will then increase 
by (Tel) 2 units, etc. Adding up all these transfer changes leads to: 
1 - (T~) + (T~) 2 - (T~I) 3 + . . . .  1/(1 + <~).  
3. Robustness and Conclusions 
We saw in section 2 that in a competitive and Walrasian stable 
world with two goods transfer paradoxes are robust with respect o 
endogenization and that endogenization tends to cause a dampening 
effect (smaller price and welfare changes) provided a revenue condition 
is fulfilled. In that section we assumed that the endogenous transfers 
are only related to the donor's expenditure l vel. It is equally plausible 
however, as argued above, to relate the transfers to the recipient's 
expenditure l vel or to the revenue levels of either country. Here we 
will see that the results derived in section 2 are very robust with 
respect o the type of endogenization. Let's analyze the most general 
formulation in which the endogenous part of the transfer is given by 
T = T(el  (p, u l ) ,  r l (p) ,  e2(p, u2), r2(p)). 
Assume that T is smooth, rising in e 1 and r 1 (the richer the donor 
gets the more it gives), decreasing in e 2 and r 2 (the richer the recipient 
gets the less it receives from the donor) and that country 1 will not give 
away all of its extra earnings or expenditures to country 2 or reduce 
the amount of the transfer to country 2 by more than country 2 earns 
or spends additionally, i.e. 0 _< Te~ < 1, 0 < Trl < 1, -1  < Te2 _< 0, 
and -1  < T~2 _< 0. After making some obvious changes in equations 
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(1), (2), and (5) and some elementary calculations it can be shown that 
the results obtained in equations (6)-(9) still hold provided we redefine 
A as [ ( I+T~-T~2)~-{x l (T~+Tr l )+XZ(T~2+T~2)}]dp/dTA [ex"
Therefore proposition 3 can be stated as follows: 
Proposition 3." The results obtained in propositions 1 and 2 are inde- 
pendent of the type of endogenization, provided that condition (10) is 
changed to 
(T~, + Tr~)drl(p)/dTA + 
+ (T~2 + T~2)dr2(p)/dTA lex < (Tel -T 2) 
(10') 
Again, the absence of price effects is sufficient for dampening. 7 
In practice, however, the third, non-participating country will be 
comprised of all countries not engaged in the transfer. This aggregate 
country (the rest of the world) will be large in comparison to countries 1
and 2, making the occurrence of significant price changes due to the 
transfer most unlikely. Thus we have a strong case for the mitigating 
welfare effects due to the endogenization of transfers. 
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